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CASE NOTES
relying on Grimshaw28 and the Continental Casualty" cases coupled with
an interpretation of the Assistant Secretary of Defense's June 4, 1956 letter
to overrule its holding in Gypsum. 8° In attempting to justify its result the
court stated it was the
probable intention of Congress to permit furnishing of bonds by
military housing contractors which did not conform with the re-
quirements of the Miller Act, so long as the form thereof was satis-
factory to the Secretary of Defense or his designee,"
The court thus has dismissed the important conclusions reached in the most
recent federal case, Travis, and overlooked the relevant portions in the Hear-
ings before the House Banking and Currency Committee that shed light on
Congress' intent in enacting the Capehart Act and its Amendment.
HELEN SLOTNICK
Sales—Liability of Cigarette Manufacturer Under Implied Warranty.—
Ross it. Philip Morris & Co.1---Plaintiff, a resident of Missouri, and a con-
firmed smoker since 1934, smoked several packages daily of Philip Morris
cigarettes from 1934 until 1952. In 1952, plaintiff discovered that he had
throat cancer. As a result of an operation for the cancer, plaintiff had to
breathe through an opening in his neck and speak with the aid of an electrical
device attached to his throat. Plaintiff sued defendant cigarette manu-
facturer, inter alia, for breach of implied warranty. Judgment was entered for
the cigarette manufacturer, and plaintiff appealed. In affirming the decision of
the district court, the Circuit Court of Appeals HELD: Under Missouri law,
a manufacturer's implied warranty means that the product is reasonably
fit for its intended use and, under proper circumstances, the manufacturer is
an insurer against recognizable dangers, but such implied warranty does not
extend to harmful effects which no developed human skills or developed
scientific knowledge could have anticipated during the period of plaintiff's
use of the product.
The controversy concerning the connection between cigarette smoking
and cancer was emphasized with the Report of the Advisory Committee to
the Surgeon General of the United States.2 This Report, after discussing the
many aspects of public health and smoking, concluded that smoking and can-
cer are causally related .2 By connecting smoking and cancer, this Report will
likely promote actions against cigarette manufacturers based on implied
28 Supra note 9.
22 Supra note 10.
33 Supra note 8.
81 Supra note 1, at 516, 197 A.2d at 566.
1 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964).
2 Smoking and Health, Report of the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of
the Public Health Service, Public Health Publication No. 1103 (1964).
3 Id. at 37.
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warranty. The courts in recent years have concerned themselves with this
problem, even before the Surgeon General's Report.
On facts similar to those of the instant case, the Fifth Circuit in Green
v. American Tobacco Co., 4
 concluded, contrary to the instant case, that the
manufacturer's knowledge or opportunity for knowledge of the dangerous
quality in his product did not qualify his liability for breach of implied
warranty. In reaching this determination, the court certified a question to the
Florida Supreme Court.5
 In its answer, the Florida court, holding absolute
liability, based its determination on these factors: (1) there was no precedent
in Florida law for the "human skill and foresight test," and (2) rulings in
Florida case law negate such a test.°
Both the instant case and Green rest on the premise that the implied
warranties involved in the sale of cigarettes are similar to those involved in
the sale of foods.? This classification has not always been the rule;° it has,
4
 Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963). Plaintiff had smoked
about two packages of the defendant's cigarettes daily from 1925 till 1956. On remand
for trial, a federal court jury decided on Nov. 28, 1964, that cigarettes are "reasonably
safe and wholesome" and therefore denied damages to the estate of Green. The question
of liability was presented to the jury in the form of two questions: (1) Are cigarettes
reasonably safe and wholesome for human consumption? (2) If they are not, what
damages should be awarded to Mr. Green's estate? The jury decided the answer to the
first question in the affirmative. N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1964, p. 1, col. 3.
5 The history of the Green case is important. In 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962) the
court, in affirming the decision of the district court, held: Under the theory of implied
warranty the manufacturer was not an absolute insurer of its product and was not liable
for plaintiff's death which resulted from lung cancer caused by smoking defendant's
cigarettes, in view of the jury's finding that there was no developed human skill or fore-
sight which could give the defendant a knowledge of possible harmful effects. The court,
however, felt the question of liability was so important, that a question was certified to
the Florida Supreme Court concerning the liability of cigarette manufacturers under
Florida's implied warranty doctrine. The certified question was as follows:
Does the law of Florida impose on a manufacturer and distributor of
cigarettes absolute liability, as for breach of implied warranty, for death caused
by using such cigarettes from 1924 or 1925 until February 1, 1956, the cancer
having developed prior to February I, 1956, and the death occurring February
25, 1958, when the defendant manufacturer and distributor could not on, or
prior to, February 1, 1956, by the reasonable application of human skill and
foresight, have known that users of such cigarettes would be endangered, by the
inhalation of main stream smoke from such cigarettes, of contracting cancer of
the lung? Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169, 170 (Fla. 1963).
The Supreme Court of Florida answered this question affirmatively, saying that a
"manufacturer's or seller's actual knowledge or opportunity for knowledge of a defective
or unwholesome condition is wholly irrelevant to his liability on the theory of implied
warranty. . . ." Id. at 170.
The Fifth Circuit, after receiving the answer to the certified question, remanded the
case to determine the issue of liability in the light of the Florida court's interpretation.
Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963).
a Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169, 170 (FIa. 1963).
7 In Ross, the court stated that it "would impose the same strict liability upon a
manufacturer of cigarettes as has been applied in the food and beverage cases." Supra note
1, at 8. In Green, the court stated that for "products intended for human consumption,
and the use of which may cause injury or death, the jury may properly apply a very
strict standard of reasonableness." Supra note 4, at 676.
8
 Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Cannon, 132 Tenn. 419, 178 S.W. 1009 (1915).
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however, been gaining acceptance.° In the sale of food an implied warranty
runs that it is fit for the purpose of human consumption." The rationale
supporting this is that deleterious food is so dangerous that, when neither
party is at fault, the one placing the defective food on the market should
bear the loss." The reliance which the buyer places on the seller's superior
knowledge, as well as the buyer's relative inability to bear loss, sustain this
approach."
In the usual implied warranty case involving food, the presence of a
foreign substance has been the basis of liability." The warranty is that food
is wholesome, fit for its purpose, and of merchantable quality, 14 but this does
not imply absolute perfection." The finding of "a mouse in a Coke bottle" is
certainly not to be expected and makes the product not only unmerchantable
but unwholesome." Where the problem involves the presence of a substance
not foreign to the product, a number of cases have reached a different result
by holding no liability." In this situation, the courts feel that, for example,
a turkey bone in turkey soup is not a foreign substance and one who par-
takes of the soup ought to anticipate the bone."
The instant decision and Green, after determining that similar war-
ranties attach to cigarettes as to food," indicated that the law of implied
9 Restatement (Second) Torts § 402A, Comment d, at 2 (Tent. Draft No. 7 1962).
10 1 Williston, Sales § 242 (rev. ed. 1948).
11 Keeton, Products Liability—Current Developments, 40 Texas L. Rev. 193 (1961).
12 Ibid.
13 Commenting on this, Prof. Spruill has said: "[T]he rats of Hamlin were as nought
in comparison with that horde of mice which has sought refreshment within Coca-Cola
bottles and died of a happy surfeit." Spruill, Privity of Contract as a Requisite on War-
ranty 19 N.C.L. Rev. 551, 566 (1941).
14 Borman v. O'Donley, 364 S.W.2d 31, 35 (Kansas City, Mo., Ct. App. 1962).
15 "There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are
quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use." Restatement
(Second) Torts, supra note 9, Comment k, at 5.
16 Beyer v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 75 S.W.2d 642 (St. Louis, Mo., Ct. App. 1934).
A large number of states apply strict liability with or without privity, regardless of negli-
gence, Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 25 (5th Cir. 1963). The Re-
statement (Second) Torts, supra note 9, at 9, lists 19 states which by case law impose
strict liability in food and drink cases and 5 states which have statutes to the same effect.
17 Mix V. Ingersoll Candy Co., 6 Cal. 2d 674, 59 P.2d 144 (1936) (chicken bone in
chicken pie); Silva v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 28 Cal. App. 2d 649, 83 P.2d 76 (1938)
(turkey bone in turkey dinner) ; Brown v. Nebiker, 229 Iowa 1223, 296 N.W. 366 (1941)
(sliver of bone in breaded porkchop). Contra, Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co.,
345 Pa. 559, 28 A.2d 913 (1942) (oyster shell in canned oysters); Wood v. Waldorf Sys-
tem Inc., 79 R.I. 1, 83 A.2d 90 (1951) (chicken bone in chicken soup).
18 See Silva v. F. W. Woolworth Co., supra note 17; Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co.,
supra note 17.
A recent Massachusetts decision, Webster v. Blue Ship Tea Room, Inc., 1964 Mass.
Adv. Sh. 731, 198 N.E.2d 309 (1964), presented the court with the question of the liability
of a restaurant owner for injuries received from a swallowed fish bone which was in a
bowl of fish chowder. The court, in holding no liability, stated at 736, 198 N.E.2d at 312:
In any event, we consider that the joys of life in New England include the ready
availability of fresh fish chowder. We should be prepared to cope with the hazards
of fish bones, the occasional presence of which in chowders is, it seems to us,
to be anticipated, and which, in the light of a'hallowed tradition, do not impair
their fitness or merchantability.
19 Supra note 7.
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warranty concerning injuries received from deleterious food imposed strict
liability. Green imposed absolute liability without qualification; 20 Ross, how-
ever, qualified strict liability by using a test of developed human skill or fore-
sight at the time?' Thus, in Missouri, implied warranty does not cover in-
jury from substances in the manufactured product whose harmful effects no
developed human skill or foresight could have anticipated. This test, how-
ever, does not imply that the manufacturer be able to prevent the subse-
quent harm, but only that he be able to foresee its possibility. Text writers
favor this position.22
In two other cases concerning smoking and cancer, Cooper v. R. J. Rey-
nolds Tobacco Co. 25 and Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,24
 the courts
found for the defendant cigarette manufacturers. Cooper discussed plaintiff's
reliance on the representations of the manufacturer. The court ruled that
plaintiff did not establish that defendant had made the representations.
Lartigue faced the same question presented by the instant case. That court
ruled:
When a claim is based on injuries from food products manu-
factured or processed for human consumption a special rule pre-
vails in a large majority of the states: strict liability, with or without
privity, regardless of negligence . . . . However, it is necessary to
show that the warranted product contained an element from which,
on the basis of existing human knowledge, harm might be expected
to flow 22
In Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.," the plaintiff sued in
implied warranty and in negligence. The Third Circuit ruled that whether
there was enough evidence to establish breach of warranty of merchantability
and whether the defendant was negligent in not conducting tests adequate to
determine the effects of smoking were jury questions. The court stated that
the jury could consider the "practices of other cigarette manufacturers and
20 Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169, 170 (Fla. 1963).
21 Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., supra note 1, at 12.
22
 See James, General Products—Should Manufacturers be Liable Without Negli-
gence? 24 Tenn, L. Rev. 923 (1957), 2 Harper & James, Torts 1584-1586 (1956).
The Uniform Commercial ,Code, which goes into effect in Missouri July 1, 1965,
discusses implied warranty, merchantability, and usage of trade. Uniform Commercial
Code, §§ 2-314, 2-315. To be merchantable, the goods must be "fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such goods are used." I 2-314(2)(c). Had the Code been in opera-
tion in Missouri at the time of suit, the warranty of merchantability is the only warranty
in the Code which could have been breached. In both Ross and Green the courts did not
claim the cigarettes to be unmerchantable. It is submitted, therefore, that had the Code
been in effect in both states at the start of the cause of action the Code would have had
no effect upon the final decision. The ithplied warranties which are determinative here
exist apart from the Uniform Commercial Code. The basis for the decisions in both cases
is supported by case precedent in each jurisdiction and cited text authorities.
23
 158 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1957), aff'd, 256 F.2d 464 (1st Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 875 (1958).
24 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963). Evidence was introduced showing that Lartigue
smoked at least two packages of cigarettes a day from 1917 till 1954.
28 Id. at 25, 35.
20 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961), reversing 134 F. Supp. 829 (W.D. Pa. 1955).
364
CASE NOTES
the quality of cigarettes they manufacture as bearing on the question of
merchantability!"27
Florida imposes absolute liability for breach of implied warranty for
harm resulting from the use of cigarettes 2 8 Therefore, as long as a causal
connection between the cancer and smoking can be established, Florida will
grant recovery. Missouri frames liability in terms of the "human skill and
foresight test."29 This stand served to protect the tobacco industry when the
state of knowledge was such that a connection between smoking and cancer
was not known. With the Report of the Surgeon General's Advisory Com-
mittee" causally connecting smoking and cancer, however, the qualified test
of Missouri might not protect the manufacturer under the implied warranty
theory. For, with the cigarette manufacturer now knowing the relationship
between cigarettes and cancer, the qualification of "human skill and fore-
sight" probably no longer applies. Therefore, Missouri is perhaps approach-
ing that level of absolute liability as presently applied in Florida.
An extension of the doctrine in the instant case and in Green could
affect other industries. For example, "ice cream and butter may contain
sufficient cholesterol to be unwholesome to persons with high blood pressure
and heart trouble."81 Perhaps the next step in the extension of implied
warranty will be to hold the dairy industry liable for resulting damages.
Liquor manufacturers, also, might be held for resulting harm to the user,
for the harm which can arise from use inheres in the product. The properties
in alcohol which can cause serious health difficulties from long and sub-
stantial use, however, it appears, have not resulted in alcohol being con-
sidered unmerchantable, unfit for human consumption, or unreasonably
dangerous." As Judge Goodrich, concurring in Pritchard, said:
If a man buys whiskey and drinks too much of it and gets
some liver trouble as a result I do not think the manufacturer is
liable unless (1) the manufacturer tells the customer the whiskey
will not hurt him or (2) the whiskey is adulterated whiskey ... .
The same surely is true 'of one who churns and sells butter to a
customer who should be on a nonfat diet.33
Turning to the Pritchard case, Judge Goodrich then stated, "In this case
there was no claim that Chesterfields are not made of commercially satis-
factory tobacco."" On this view, the warranty liability of dairy, liquor and
tobacco producers would depend upon whether or not the product is commer-
cially satisfactory or merchantable, that is, fit for the purpose of eating,
drinking, or smoking, regardless of potentially dangerous harm from sub-
stances inhering in the product itself .a 5
27 Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., supra note 26, at 297.
28 Green v. American Tobacco Co., supra note 4.
29 Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., supra note 1.
30 Smoking & Health, supra note 2.
81 Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., supra note 24, at 37.
32 Restatement (Second) Torts, supra note 9, Comment i, at 5.
as Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., supra note 26, at 302.
84 Ibid.
8 Protection from this kind of harm might better be formed through Food and
Drug Administration regulations than through an extension of the warranty theory.
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A possible solution to the question of the liability for cancer caused by
smoking is the recent ruling of the Federal Trade Commission." The
Commission has ruled that cigarette manufacturers must place on every
package of cigarettes a caution concerning the possible harmful effects of
smoking." The manufacturer, in this way, would be informing the con-
sumer that the safety of his product for all users is questionable. If the con-
sumer then decides to use the product, any harm caused will no longer be
the responsibility of the manufacturer. 38 For, with unavoidably unsafe pro-
ducts, the manufacturer should not be strictly liable for damages resulting
from their use as long as the product is properly prepared and proper warning
is given." The action on the part of the consumer using the product with
knowledge of the danger is Vquite often treated as assumption of risk." 40
With the present state of knowledge concerning smoking and cancer, the
Missouri position, it appears, will result in strict liability for the cigarette
manufacturer. With food, which is a human need, the liability should be
strict for the policy is to protect the consumer from the defective product."
Tobacco, however, is not a product necessary for human life. With properly
prepared food, the unwholesomeness does not inhere in the food. In tobacco,
however, the harmful ingredients inhere in the product. Publicity concerning
the harmful effects of tobacco has alerted the public to the possible dangers.
The Surgeon General's Report highlights this point. A warning on the cig-
arette package about possible harmful effects will emphasize this problem
and serve to keep the public aware of the possible danger. With all these
factors confronting the consumer, it would seem that one who buys cigarettes
86 29 Fed. Reg. 8324 (1964). The Tobacco Institute, criticizing this ruling, issued
the "Statement on Behalf of the Tobacco Institute, Inc." (1964).
37 The FTC ruled that it is an unfair or deceptive act "to fail to disclose, clearly
and prominently, in all advertising and on every pack, box, carton or other container in
which cigarettes are sold to the consuming public that cigarette smoking is dangerous to
health and may cause death from cancer and other diseases." 29 Fed. Reg. 8325 (1964).
The Commission first proposed specific language to be used in the warning but later
eliminated the requirement of specific words. The individual advertiser may now "formu-
late the required disclosure in any manner that intelligibly conveys the sense of the
required disclosure in a fully conspicuous fashion." 29 Fed. Reg. 8373 (1964). The rule as
to advertising shall become effective July 1, 1965. 29 Fed. Reg. 8325 (1964).
38 Dillard & Hart, Product Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty to Warn, 41
Va. L. Rev. 145, 160 (1955). In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d
69 (1960), the court chose to reject the use of the disclaimer by the defendant. Quaere,
whether a similar approach could be taken by the courts when it is a question of liability
of a cigarette manufacturer who put a warning on his product.
39 Restatement (Second) Torts, supra note 9, Comment k, at 5.
40 Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
Yale 1099, 1148 (1960). Cf. Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22
La. L. Rev. 122 (1961).
Strict liability is an obligation which cannot be disclaimed, Restatement (Second)
Torts, supra note 9, Comment m, at 7. Strict liability, however, applies only where the
defective condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user.
"Many products cannot possibly be made safe for all consumption, and any food or drug
necessarily involves some risk of harm if only from over consumption. . . Good
tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be
harmful." Supra, Comment i, at 5.
41 Restatement ,(Second) Torts, supra note 9,.Comment c, at 2.
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has assumed the risk of possible harmful effects from their use and should be
subject to this defense in an action of implied warranty.
JAMES JEROME COOGAN
Secured Transactions—After Acquired Property Clause—Priority to
"Equipment Under the Uniform Commercial Code."—United States v.
Baptist Golden Age Home. 1—This was a foreclosure action by the United
States, brought for the use and benefit of the Federal Housing Commission,
against the defendant Baptist Golden Age Home. On August 18, 1960,
Baptist executed and delivered to T. J. Bettes Company an installment
promissory note and deed of trust on its real property. The deed of trust
and note, which were set out in the court's opinion, 2 contained an after-
acquired property clause which encumbered:
[A] 11 fixtures, including but not limited to all . . • furniture ... and
other furnishings; and
AlI articles of personal property . . . now or hereafter attached
to or used in and about the building. . . .
These instruments were recorded in the office of the county recorder of deeds
on August 19, 1960. Subsequently, Baptist defaulted and the entire indebted-
ness became- due. On February 12, 1963, the Federal Housing Commission
(hereinafter the United States) received by way of assignment all interest
in the deed of trust and note. The United States recorded this assignment
in the office of the county recorder of deeds and then commenced proceedings
against Baptist to foreclose the security interest. At the foreclosure pro-
ceedings, Hilton Furniture Company intervened, alleging that it had sold.
Baptist certain furniture, furnishings and carpeting under a conditional
sales contract dated June 18, 1962, and that the entire amount of the con-
tract price remained unpaid. Hilton further claimed that the United States
acquired no interest in this property since Hilton retained title to the goods
under the conditional sales contract, and that its interest in the chattels
was thus superior to that of the, United States. Hilton, however, never re-
corded this conditional sales contract. HELD: The United States' interest
in the furniture, furnishings and carpeting created by the prior deed of trust
containing the after-acquired property clause was superior to Hilton's in-
terest under Sections 9-301 and 9-312(4) of the Uniform Commercial Codes
The court reasoned that Hilton was not entitled to priority because it had
not perfected its interest4 in the collateral5 by filing under Sections 9-312(4)
1 226 F. Supp. 892 (WD, Ark. 1964).
2
 Id. at 896.
The sections of the Arkansas Uniform Commercial Code utilized are unchanged
from the official text of the Uniform Commercial Code and will be cited as "UCC —."
4 The court relied on UCC § 9-102, and held Hilton's retention of title was only
the reservation of a "security interest." United States v. Baptist, supra note 1, at 898-99.
5 The court found the furniture, furnishings and carpeting were "equipment" under
UCC 9-109(2) and thus filing was required. United States v. Baptist, supra note 1,
at 900.
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